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I 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal by Joseph Billings (plaintiff and appellant) from the final 
judgment of the District Court of Utah, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake, County (Case No. 
090907164) entered for defendants and respondents Paul James Toscano and Paul Toscano, 
P.C. The judgment disposed all of the claims alleged in this action on a motion for 
summary judgment filed by respondents. The clerk of the Third District Court filed the 
order granting summary judgment on October 27, 2009. 
II 
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY AND APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from the foregoing judgment, which finally disposes all of the 
issues between the parties. Notice of Appeal was filed timely on November 23, 2009. [CT, 
Vol. II, 403]. The court of appeals notified the parties that a final order had not been 
prepared according to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (f) (2) and entered by the clerk of 
the court. Respondents (the prevailing parties) thereafter submitted a proposed final order 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (f) (2) on February 18, 2010. The district court 
entered final judgment on February 24, 2010. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah State Rules of Court 3 and 42. 
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Ill 
ISSUES RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Count One of 
the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process Because Appellant Controverted 
Respondents' Assertion of Prior Settlement of the Claim and Established 
Disputed Material Facts and Genuine Issues in Support of the Cause of Action. 
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 246] [CT, Vol. II, 209-224] 
[CT, Vol. II, 225] [CT, Vol. II, 234] [CT, Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT, 
Vol. II, 234] 
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's 
Estate Did Not Bar Count One of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of 
Process or Any Other Cause of Action Contained in First Amended Complaint 
Because Respondents Failed to Assert and Explicitly Waived the Affirmative 
Defenses of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in the Trial Court. 
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol I, 209] [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT, 
Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234] 
The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's 
Estate Did Not In Any Case Satisfy the Requirements of Res Judicata or 
Collateral Estoppel And Even if Respondents had not Waived these 
Affirmative Defenses, the Trial Court Should Have Denied Summary 
Judgment on the Basis of Appellant's Affidavits 
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 
(order after ruling)] [RT, 8, Lines 5-11] [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after hearing)] 
[CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after hearing)] [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed 
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Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules] [CT, Vol. II, 366 
(Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules] 
4. Respondents Failed to File a Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of 
Summary Adjudication of Counts Two and Three of the First Cause of Action 
for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third 
Cause of Action for Negligence Contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 303] [CT, Vol. II 347, 349, n.2] 
[CT, Vol. II, 246-261] [CT, Vol. II, 303-346] [CT, Vol. II, 246; Vol. II, 303-346] 
5. The Trial Court Should Have Denied Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the First Amended Complaint Because Appellant Filed Sufficient 
Affidavits to Establish a Genuine Factual Dispute Concerning Claims that 
Toscano Asserted a Settlement Agreement Obtained by Fraud in Support of 
Summary Judgment. 
Issue Raised Before the Trial Court: [CT, Vol. II, 366] 
Review of the trial court order granting summary judgment is de novo. Simms v. 
Oklahoma 165F.3dl32h 1326 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 815, 120 S.Ct. 53 
(1999). The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from them 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (plaintiff and appellant). Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The applicability of the affirmative 
defenses oi res judicata or collateral estoppel is a question of law, which appellate courts 
9 
also consider de novo. Proctor Gamble Corporation v. Amway Corporation 376 F.2d 496 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
IV 
APPLICALBE RULES OF COURT ON APPEAL 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c) (3) (A): 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue 
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation 
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in 
the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure Section 7 (c) (3) (A). 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment 
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
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(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to 
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
Appellant filed a complaint in the district court on April 30, 2009 containing a 
single cause of action for abuse of process against appellees Paul James Toscano and Paul 
Toscano P.C. The complaint alleged that appellees had filed a voluntary petition under 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in behalf of a petitioner whom appellees 
knew did not qualify for relief under Chapter 7. The complaint further alleged that 
respondents did not file the petition for legitimate debt relief, but rather filed the petition 
solely for the ulterior purpose of circumventing a lawsuit pending in California Superior 
Court against the debtor for fraud and quiet title to real property. The complaint also 
alleged that respondents intentionally abused Chapter 7 within the meanings of 11 U.S.C. 
Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1); 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), and 11 U.S.C. Section 
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707 (b) (3) and that respondents therefore also violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 9011 [CT, Vol.1, 2]. 
Respondent Toscano deployed various efforts to evade and deny personal service of 
the complaint. Ultimately, respondents filed a motion on May 8, 2009 to dismiss the action 
alleging that the Utah District Court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction [CT, 
Vol. I, 11]. Appellant filed an Affidavit of Process Server on June 1, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 99-
101] and opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss on June 9, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 102].1 
On August 21, 2009 respondents filed a motion for expedited summary judgment 
[CT, Vol. I, 136]. Respondents served notice of an expedited hearing set for September 1, 
2009 by e-mail on August 22, 2009 [CT, Vol. I, 136]. Appellant quickly filed opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment on August 27, 2009, which incorporated a 
memorandum of points and authorities, a statement controverting respondents' statement of 
undisputed facts, and a statement of disputed facts and genuine issues [CT, Vol. II, 209-
224]. On August 31, 2009 appellant filed a separate Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Opposition to respondent's motion [CT, Vol. II, 225] and a 
Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues [CT, Vol. II, 234]. 
On August 31, 2009 appellant also filed and served a First Amended Complaint 
alleging three causes of action: (1) Abuse of Process (three separate and distinct counts); (2) 
Fraud, and (3) Negligence. Count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process 
1
 Respondent Toscano employs signature sharp practices. He appeared in this action 
essentially pro per through his law partner and did not serve the motion to dismiss for 
alleged lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction until almost a month after filing it. 
Respondents have never filed an answer to the complaint. 
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re-alleged the single cause of action contained in the original complaint against 
respondents for intentionally abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 
2008. But counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the 
Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence 
contained in the First Amended Complaint alleged entirely new claims against respondents, 
which arose from conduct committed by respondents on April 15, 2009 and after appellant 
filed the original complaint on April 30, 2009. The two new and distinct counts of abuse of 
process and the additional claims for fraud and negligence had separate and different 
factual bases than the original complaint, which contained only a single cause of action 
against respondents for intentionally abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code in 2008 [CT, Vol. II, 246]. The district court nevertheless convened a hearing on 
September 1, 2009 on respondents' expedited motion for summary judgment of the 
original complaint. At the time of the expedited hearing (September 1, 2009), respondents 
had not yet had an opportunity (due to their own procedural strategies) to file a response to 
the First Amended Complaint (filed August 31, 2009). The court took the matter under 
submission after oral argument. 
On September 17, 2009, in response to appellant's First Amended Complaint, 
respondents filed a motion, which urged the court to essentially ignore the First Amended 
Complaint, which superseded the original complaint. [CT, Vol. II, 246]. Respondents filed 
a novel motion on September 17, 2009 to "consolidate the claims made in the amended 
complaint with those in plaintiffs original complaint" [CT, Vol. II, 303]. The First 
Amended Complaint indeed re-alleged the single claim for abuse of process contained in 
14 
the original complaint as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process. But 
the First Amended Complaint also contained two new and entirely distinct counts of abuse 
of process (counts two and three of the first cause of action) and additional causes of action 
for fraud (second cause of action) and for negligence (third cause of action). The First 
Amended Complaint also alleged facts entirely new, separate, and distinct from the facts 
alleged in support of the original complaint for a single count of abuse of process [CT, Vol. 
II, 246-261]. Respondents nevertheless moved the court to simply consider its original 
summary judgment motion as a motion for summary judgment of the entire First Amended 
Complaint [CT, Vol. II, 303-346]. Accordingly, respondents failed to file a Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in Support of summary adjudication of counts two and three of the First 
Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, or the Third 
Cause of Action for Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint [CT, Vol. II, 
246; Vol. II, 303-346].3 
3
 Respondents eventually claimed that a settlement agreement (purportedly effective as of 
March 30, 2009) somehow barred every cause of action contained in the First Amended 
Complaint for conduct committed by respondents after April 15, 2009. But, with the sole 
exception of count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the First 
Amended Complaint alleged claims for abuse of process (two new counts), fraud, and 
negligence, which arose from respondents' separate and distinct misconduct newly 
committed on and after April 15, 2009. Respondents stopped short of alleging that 
appellant had actually entered into an agreement effective March 30, 2009 that waived 
claims against them for any and all acts, which might be committed by respondents in the 
future i.e. after March 30, 2009. And to be sure, even the sham settlement agreement, 
which respondents filed in support of their motion for summary judgment of the original 
complaint, does not contain any such provision. [CT, Vol. I, 142-208]. Hence, respondents 
failed to file a Statement of Disputed Facts in support of summary adjudication of the new 
claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint. 
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On September 23, 2009, appellant filed an affidavit, which again controverted 
respondents' Statement of Undisputed Facts (which pertained exclusively to count one of 
the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the First Amended Complaint 
[CT, Vol. II, 358]), a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues as to 
Material Facts pertaining to all cause of actions contained in the First Amended Complaint 
[CT, Vol. II, 366], and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition 
to respondents' "consolidated" motion for summary judgment [CT, Vol. II, 347].4 
Appellant also filed on September 23, 2009 a request for a hearing on respondents' 
"Motion to Consolidate 'the claims made in the amended complaint with those in 
plaintiffs original complaint' and for Summary Judgment" [CT, Vol. II, 380]. The district 
court did not convene a separate hearing on respondents' motions [CT, Vol. II, 398]. 
Nevertheless, the court entered an order on October 27, 2009 granting summary judgment 
of the entire First Amended Complaint for respondents [CT, Vol. II, 398].5 
B. Statement of Facts 
On or about June 9, 2008, appellant filed a cross-complaint in California Superior 
Court against an individual to Quiet Title to real property and for Slander of Title, 
4
 Inasmuch as respondents concluded that the First Amended Complaint was identical to 
the original complaint, respondents in essence failed to file a motion for summary 
judgment of the First Amended Complaint, or at least a motion that complied with the 
procedural requirements of Utah Rules of Court . Instead, as respondent himself puts it, 
"Toscano essentially reasserted] its original summary judgment motion" [CT, Vol. II, 303, 
304], which did not include a Statement of Undisputed Facts that was at all relevant to the 
new causes of action contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
5
 The court also denied respondents' motions to dismiss for lack of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. [CT, Vol. II, 398]. 
16 
Cancellation of Instruments, Fraud, Resulting Trust, and Conversion.6 In response to the 
cross-claims, respondents filed a Chapter 7 petition in Federal Bankruptcy Court in Salt 
Lake City, Utah in behalf of the individual (hereinafter the "debtor") to block and 
circumvent the debtor's own California action. Yet at the time that respondents filed the 
voluntary petition, respondent Toscano (the debtor's attorney) knew that the debtor did not 
qualify for relief under Chapter 7 and that the debtor's filing abused Chapter 7 within the 
meanings of 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1); 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), 
and 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (3). [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. 
II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's 
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. 
Respondent Toscano is a bankruptcy law expert, and he knew that a presumption of 
abuse arises under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1) if a debtor's monthly income, 
reduced by allowance deductions and multiplied by sixty, is equal to or greater than 
twenty-five percent of the non-priority unsecured claims or $6,575.00 (whichever is greater) 
or if the product is greater than $10,950.00 ($182.50 per month). 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) 
(2) (A) (1). To be sure, the debtor and respondent Toscano had completed Means Test 
Form B22 as required under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) before filing the petition for 
relief, and the results triggered the presumption that the debtor was abusing Chapter 7. 
Means Test Form B22 contains an objective formula. The Means Test is designed to 
separate debtors who are abusing Chapter 7 from legitimate debtors by identifying debtors 
who have the ability (means) to pay creditors as a matter of law and therefore do not 
6
 The property is located in California, and the defendant resided in California before 
moving to Utah. 
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qualify for Chapter 7 relief. Hence, respondent Toscano knew before he filed the Chapter 
7 petition in behalf of the debtor that the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 7 relief. [CT, 
Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, (Request for Judicial Notice of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules)]. 
Respondent Toscano also knew before he filed the petition that the debtor had the 
burden pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I) to rebut the presumption that the 
debtor was abusing Chapter 7. Moreover, respondent Toscano knew that the debtor was 
obliged to rebut the presumption of abuse pursuant tol 1 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I) 
exclusively by demonstrating "special circumstances" within the meaning of tol 1 U.S.C. 
c Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I), such as a serious medical condition or a call to active duty in 
the Armed Forces. Respondent Toscano also knew before he filed the petition that the 
debtor could not rebut the presumption that she was abusing Chapter 7 by demonstrating 
such "special circumstances" under 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I). [CT, Vol. II, 366 
(Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, (Request for Judicial Notice of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules)]. 
Accordingly, respondent Toscano was charged with knowledge before he filed the petition 
that the debtor, as a matter of law, had the ability to pay her creditors and that filing the 
petition would therefore be a flagrant, per se abuse of Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. Section 
707 (b) (2) (A) (1) and 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (B) (I) (1). Nevertheless, respondent 
Toscano filed the petition in behalf of the debtor. [CT, Vol. II, 366]. 
Respondent Toscano and the debtor also admitted in their petition filed under 
penalty of perjury that the debtor's California Superior Court action (Case no. MCVMS 
18 
08151) to quiet title to real property (hereinafter the "property" or the "disputed property"), 
brought pursuant to an Affidavit of Joint Tenant fraudulently executed by the debtor, 
constituted a liability of the debtor for punitive damages to California attorney, Dee Davis 
(for malicious prosecution) and to appellant, Joseph Billings (for slander of title). 
Respondent Toscano and the debtor openly sought to discharge these liabilities for punitive 
damages in their petition. Yet, at the same time, respondent Toscano duplicitously urged 
the Chapter 7 Trustee to seize the property (which was the target of the malicious action 
and the debtor's fraud) as the debtor's legitimate asset in order to liquidate the debtor's 
small consumer debt. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, 
Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 
7 Petition and Schedules]. 
In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, respondent Toscano misused 
court process by filing the Chapter 7 petition and causing a Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Case to be filed in California Superior Court Case No. MCVMS 08151 and enjoining its 
prosecution pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362. Respondent Toscano committed these 
acts characteristically in pursuit of collateral litigation advantages, i.e., (1) to circumvent 
the California Superior Court quiet title and fraud actions against the debtor; (2) to cause 
the Chapter 7 Trustee to improperly seize the disputed property pursuant to the debtor's 
false claims to be the exclusive owner of the property; (3) to cause the Chapter 7 Trustee to 
attempt to sell the property to liquidate the debtor's consumer debt, and (4) to harass 
appellant, cause unnecessary delays, and escalate appellant's litigation costs. Respondent 
Toscano also violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 and Chapter 13, Rule 
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3.1, of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice when he ignored the results 
of the Means Test and filed the petition in the foregoing acts of sharp practice. [CT, Vol. 
II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. 
Therefore, on July 16, 2008, appellant amended the California cross-complaint against the 
debtor to include a cause of action for flagrant abuse of process against respondent 
Toscano. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. 
Appellant entered into a settlement agreement with the debtor, the Chapter 7 Trustee, 
the U.S. Trustee, and respondent Toscano on January 28, 2009 (Amended March 30, 2009). 
According to the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, the debtor was required 
to execute a grant deed transferring all rights and interests in the disputed property to 
appellant or his designate. In exchange for the debtor's execution of the grant deed 
transferring exclusive title to the disputed property to appellant, appellant agreed to dismiss 
his causes of action against the debtor for Slander of Title, Cancellation of Instruments, 
Fraud, Resulting Trust, Conversion, and the cause of action for Abuse of Process alleged 
against respondent Toscano for filing a Chapter 7 petition in 2008 in violation of 11 U.S.C. 
Sections 707 (b) (1), 707 (b) (2), and 707 (b) (3) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
The terms and conditions of the settlement agreement also required respondent Toscano to 
7
 The United States Trustee eventually conducted an independent and disinterested 
Comparative Analysis of the debtor's schedules, and the independent analysis also revealed 
that a presumption of abuse arose pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 707 (b) (2) (A) (1) that the 
debtor was abusing Chapter 7. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 
378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's 
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. 
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seek the bankruptcy court's approval of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement 
(amended March 30? 2009) at a hearing ultimately set for August 20, 2009. 
Pursuant to an agreement between respondent Toscano and appellant, appellant 
drafted the essential components of the agreement (nearly the entire agreement), and 
respondent Toscano was to submit the agreement to the bankruptcy court for approval 
pursuant to a motion under his signature. In reliance upon respondent Toscano's 
representation that he would seek the court's approval of the terms and conditions as 
prepared by appellant (and approved by respondent Toscano, the debtor, the Chapter 7 
Trustee, and the U.S. Trustee), appellant agreed to be bound by the agreement and 
dismissed his causes of action against the debtor with prejudice after respondent Toscano, 
the debtor, the Chapter 7 Trustee, and the U.S. Trustee signed the agreement. [CT, Vol. II, 
366-377]. 
In the meantime, a disgruntled potential claimant to the property threatened to file a 
complaint with the Utah State Bar against respondent Toscano for proceeding in the 
bankruptcy court with a conflict of interest with the debtor unless respondent Toscano 
abandoned the settlement. The claims for abuse of process had been filed against the 
debtor and respondent Toscano (the debtor's attorney), and they sprang primarily from 
respondent Toscano's negligence and malfeasance in abusing Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy 
code in overzealous representation of the debtor. Respondent Toscano is apparently 
vulnerable to state bar discipline inasmuch as he proposed settlement of the claims against 
him in exchange for his arrangement of the debtor's waiver of her own potential one-third 
interest in the disputed property in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 1.7, of the Utah Supreme 
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Court Rules of Professional Practice. Respondent Toscano himself contributed nothing to 
the settlement value. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. 
After receipt of the threat, respondent Toscano refused to seek the bankruptcy 
court's approval of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (amended March 30, 2009). 
[CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. Instead, on or about April 10, 2009 respondent Toscano altered the 
settlement agreement drafted by appellant to unilaterally provide (1) that the disgruntled 
claimant would receive an unconditional 50% interest in the property, (2) that the claimant 
(heavily saddled with creditor judgments) could take title to the property in his name 
pursuant to a quit claim deed to be executed by the debtor, and (3) omitting the requirement 
that the debtor transfer her interests in the property to appellant pursuant to a grant deed 
and adding that the debtor would transfer her interests in the property pursuant to a quit 
claim deed only. [CT, Vol. II, 366-377]. In light of the fact that respondent Toscano had 
wholly undermined the value of the parties' settlement agreement, appellant promptly 
notified respondent Toscano in writing on April 10, 2009 that (1) respondent Toscano had 
breached the parties' settlement agreement, (2) that appellant rejected the proposed 
unilateral changes to the legitimate settlement agreement, (3) and that appellant was no 
longer willing to dismiss or waive his pending claim against respondent Toscano for abuse 
of process (filing a Chapter 7 petition in per se abuse of Chapter 7 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code in 2008). 
In light of respondent Toscano's repudiation of the January 28, 2009 settlement 
agreement (as amended March 30, 2009), appellant re-filed in the Utah State District Court 
appellant's claim for abuse of process arising from respondents' filing of a Chapter 7 
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petition in violation of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In response to appellant's 
complaint, respondent Toscano deployed his signature strategy of abusing judicial 
proceedings for ulterior purposes. Respondent filed groundless motions in the debtor's 
name on April 30, 2009 to enjoin the state court action and to remove it to the federal 
bankruptcy court. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request 
for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 
Petition and Schedules]. Yet the Utah State Court action was brought exclusively against 
respondent Toscano for abuse of process -not the debtor. [CT, Vol. I, 2]. As a 
bankruptcy law expert, respondent Toscano knew at the time that he brought his motion in 
the federal bankruptcy court in the debtor's name to enjoin the state action against him 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362 that he had no standing to bring the motion and that 11 
U.S.C. Section 362 applies only to actions against the debtor or for control or possession 
of the debtor's property. Additionally, respondent Toscano knew at the time that he 
brought his motion in the federal bankruptcy court in the debtor's name to remove the state 
action against him to federal bankruptcy court (1) that he had no standing to bring the 
motion, (2) that he had brought the motion long after the statutory time had expired for 
bringing removal motions, and (3) that the federal bankruptcy court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction over state law claims, which are not against the debtor, the debtor's property, 
or impact the debtor's estate. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 
8
 The April 30, 2009 complaint contained a single cause of action for abuse of process, 
which arose from respondent Toscano's filing the abusive Chapter 7 petition. This claim is 
re-alleged as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the 
First Amended Complaint filed on September 31, 2009. 
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378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's 
Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. 
Respondent Toscano nevertheless attempted to intimidate appellant (and the state 
court) by falsely and emphatically declaring (in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 4.1, of the 
Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice) that 11 U.S.C. Section 362 applied to 
the debtor's attorney as well as the debtor and that the federal bankruptcy court therefore 
had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs abuse of process claims. 
Appellant responded to respondent's false declarations by making several requests that 
respondent either provide citations to authorities in support of his motions or to withdraw 
them. Respondent Toscano replied: "No comment." Respondent Toscano also failed to 
reveal any authority in support of his claims at the hearing on his motions held on August 
20, 2009. Respondent Toscano had simply filed the motions defiantly (1) in an attempt to 
secure a more favorable venue for litigation of the state law claims against him, (2) in an 
attempt to cause the bankruptcy court to issue improper rulings, which would cause 
appellant to incur the costs and time expenditures necessary to appeal the rulings, (3) to 
otherwise escalate appellant's litigation costs, (4) delay progress of the state court action, 
and (5) to harass appellant who resides in Shanghai, China with frivolous motions in an 
effort to discourage prosecution of the state court claims against him.9 
9
 Respondent Toscano's attempts to frustrate prosecution of the original April 30, 2009 
complaint against him by filing groundless motions in federal bankruptcy court to enjoin 
and remove the action to federal bankruptcy court constitute the factual basis of count two 
of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process alleged in the First Amended Complaint 
filed on August 31, 2009. [CT, Vol.11, 246-261]. 
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Then, respondent Toscano cut and pasted the parties' January 28, 2009 settlement 
agreement (as amended March 30, 2009), which appellant had initially drafted, and 
unilaterally altered it to (1) provide that the disgruntled claimant would receive an 
unconditional 50% interest in the property, (2) to provide that the claimant could take title 
to the property in his name despite crippling debt pursuant to a quit claim deed to be 
executed by the debtor, and (4) to omit the requirement that the debtor transfer her interests 
in the property to appellant pursuant to a grant deed and adding that the debtor would 
transfer her interests in the property pursuant to a quit claim deed only. [CT, Vol. II, 366-
377]. Respondent Toscano presented the altered January 28, 2009 agreement (as amended 
March 30, 2009) as his own product to the bankruptcy court and filed the fraudulent 
document as the parties' true settlement agreement in the bankruptcy court on April 15, 
2009. Respondent also falsely reported to the court in violation of Chapter 13, Rule 3.3 of 
the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice [making false statements to a 
tribunal] that appellant had agreed to the unilateral changes. [CT, Vol. II, 347-357; 366-
377]. In response to respondent Toscano' post-April 15, 2009 conduct, appellant filed a 
First Amended Complaint on August 31, 2009 in the Utah District court alleging new 
counts of Abuse of Process, Fraud, and Negligence.10 
The bankruptcy court set August 20, 2009 for a hearing on respondents' motions to 
enjoin the Utah State Court proceedings, removal of the state court proceedings to federal 
10
 Respondent Toscano's preparation and filing of the sham settlement agreement in federal 
bankruptcy court constitute the basis of count three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse 
of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for 
Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
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bankruptcy court, and settlement of the debtor's estate. The federal bankruptcy court 
denied defendant's motions to enjoin the state court action against him and to remove the 
state court action to federal bankruptcy court. The court declared that it could find no 
authority that "even remotely supports" defendant Toscano's motion to enjoin the state 
court action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362 since the action was brought exclusively 
against respondent and not the debtor. The court also ruled that the federal bankruptcy 
court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the state court claims against respondent 
because they were not alleged against the debtor nor did they impact the debtor's estate. 
[CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial 
Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and 
Schedules].11 
The bankruptcy court also approved settlement of the debtor's estate according to 
the terms and conditions contained in the sham settlement agreement. Respondents falsely 
represented to the court that appellant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the 
unilaterally altered, unsigned agreement, which respondents had submitted to the court 
in place of the agreement actually drafted and entered into by appellant.12 The bankruptcy 
court granted the motion to settle the debtor's estate, but declined appellant's request to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to (1) determine the terms and conditions of the settlement; 
11
 In light of these rulings, appellant is actually entitled as a matter of law to summary 
judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process and the 
Third Cause of Action for Negligence contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
12
 Appellant had provided e-mail approval of the parties' original January 28, 2009 
settlement agreement. Respondents falsely advised the bankruptcy court and the Utah 
District Court that the e-mail approval pertained to the unilaterally altered version of the 
parties' agreement. 
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(2) allow appellant an opportunity to introduce written evidence (pre-marked and lodged 
with the clerk) to demonstrate that respondents had altered the parties' original settlement 
agreement; and (3) to establish that appellant had withdrawn his offer to dismiss his claim 
for abuse of process against respondents (count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse 
of Process) in writing because respondents refused to honor the terms and conditions of 
the parties original settlement agreement. Having asserted the bankruptcy court's lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction over this state court action, the bankruptcy court did not 
consider any of the claims currently alleged in the First Amended Complaint. [CT, Vol. II, 
366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
A. Summary of the Argument 
1. It is well established that courts do not decide factual disputes on summary 
judgment motion; they simply decide whether there is a factual dispute or genuine issue of 
law. Respondents claimed in the district court that the original complaint filed on April 30, 
2009 (which was ultimately re-alleged as count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse 
of Process in the First Amended Complaint) was barred by a prior settlement agreement 
purportedly effective March 30, 2009. But appellant denied respondents' claim and filed 
an Affidavit Controverting Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts and an Affidavit of 
Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues to demonstrate that (1) respondents had actually 
repudiated the parties' legitimate January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended 
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March 30, 2009); (2) that respondents unilaterally altered the legitimate agreement to 
create a sham, unsigned settlement agreement (which respondents filed in support of 
summary judgment); and (3) that appellant had rejected the unilateral changes and 
withdrew the original offer of settlement in writing. Appellant's affidavits were sufficient 
to refute, and establish disputed facts and genuine issues pertaining to, respondents' 
affirmative defense of "prior settlement" to count one of the First Cause of Action for 
Abuse of Process as alleged in the First Amended Complaint (and all other claims 
alleged in the First Amended Complaint) . One good faith affidavit controverting the 
moving parties' assertion of undisputed facts is sufficient to overcome summary judgment. 
Therefore, the district court should have denied respondents' motion for summary 
judgment in light of the controverting affidavits. 
2. Additionally, respondents failed to file a Statement of Undisputed Facts in 
support of their second "consolidated" motion for summary judgment of the First 
Amended Complaint, which alleged new causes of action with factual bases entirely 
distinct from the original complaint (counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for 
Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action 
for Negligence). The district court should have denied the "consolidated" motion for 
summary judgment on this ground alone. 
3. Appellant, on the other hand, filed an Affidavit of Disputed Facts and 
Genuine Issues in support of each of the causes of action contained in the First Amended 
Complaint. Moreover, appellant demonstrated by affidavit that counts two and three of 
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the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and 
the Third Cause of Action for Negligence arose from acts committed by respondents after 
the effective date (March 30, 2009) of the sham settlement agreement filed by respondents. 
Accordingly, the affidavit demonstrated that even the sham settlement agreement filed by 
respondents in support of summary judgment of the original complaint (and "reasserted" 
against the First Amended Complaint) did not contain a provision that releases 
respondents from all future conduct committed after March 30, 2009. Hence, appellant's 
affidavits and respondents' own exhibit (the sham settlement agreement itself) were 
sufficient to establish disputed facts and genuine issues pertaining to all of the causes of 
action newly alleged in the First Amended Complaint. The district court, therefore, should 
have denied respondents' "consolidated" motion for summary judgment of the First 
Amended Complaint. 
4. Since the affidavits filed by appellant were facially sufficient to overcome a 
summary judgment motion, respondents had only one avenue left open to them to pursue 
summary judgment, namely to demonstrate that all of the causes of action alleged or 
issues contained in the First Amended Complaint had already been decided after an 
evidentiary hearing in a separate action such that each cause of action might be barred by 
the affirmative defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel. But respondents not only 
failed to assert these affirmative defenses in support of their summary judgment motion, 
they actually insisted emphatically before the district court that neither affirmative 
defense was relevant to their motions. Hence, respondents are bound by this admission 
on appeal, and respondents cannot, in any case, assert affirmative defenses on appeal in 
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support of summary judgment {res judicata or collateral estoppel), which they failed to 
assert and in fact vigorously disclaimed and urged the trial court to ignore. 
5. The trial court did in fact ignore the due process requirements of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel The district court characterized appellant's opposition to the 
respondents' summary judgment motion as a collateral attack on the federal bankruptcy 
court judgment. But appellant did not attack the federal court judgment in the Utah 
District Court. That judgment stands and now controls disposition of the debtor's estate. 
But it does not control disposition of separate state court claims against respondents for 
damages, especially damages claimed against respondents for obtaining the judgment 
itself hy fraud and malfeasance. Appellant simply contended that the federal bankruptcy 
court judgment cannot determine the claims or issues in this separate action alleging 
state law claims for damages against respondents because the order settling the 
debtor's estate did not satisfy the requirements of res judicata (prior determination of same 
causes of action after an evidentiary hearing) or collateral estoppel (prior determination of 
controlling issues after an evidentiary hearing) such that it might determine the claims or 
issues raised in this separate action. Lawlor v. National Screen Services Corporation 39 
U.S. 322, 327. None of the causes of action or any controlling issue contained in this 
Utah State Court action was determined in the federal court after an evidentiary hearing. 
And even the sham "settlement agreement" approved by the federal bankruptcy court 
related exclusively to count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process 
contained in the First Amended Complaint. Appellant's second and third counts of abuse 
of process, the second cause of action for fraud, and the third cause of action for 
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negligence each arose from acts committed by respondents after the date of the approved 
sham settlement (filing groundless motions, sham documents, and securing settlement of 
the debtor's estate through fraud and malfeasance). None of these claims was even before 
the bankruptcy court, much less determined after an evidentiary hearing. 
6. Moreover, the district court overlooked the fact that the bankruptcy court 
also declared that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged in the state 
court action and that it also lacked grounds to enjoin them. Hence, in light of all of the 
bankruptcy court orders, appellant—not respondent- is ultimately entitled to summary 
judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process and the 
Third Cause of Action for Negligence, which arose from respondents' filing of frivolous 
motions (filed after even the sham settlement agreement was purportedly entered into by 
the parties) to enjoin the April 30, 2009 state court action and remove it to federal 
bankruptcy court. 
7. Additionally, the court overlooked that count three of the First Cause of 
Action for Abuse of Process and the Second Cause of Action for Fraud allege that the 
bankruptcy court order (settling the debtor's estate) was itself obtained through 
respondents' fraud and malfeasance. These claims seek compensatory and punitive 
damages against respondents for (1) obtaining the order itself through malfeasance and (2) 
committing fraud against appellant by repudiating the parties' legitimate settlement 
agreement after appellant dismissed his claims against the debtor for punitive damages 
with prejudice. These claims have never been considered by any court. Accordingly, 
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they would not be subject to dismissal pursuant to res judicata or collateral estoppel, even 
if respondents had actually asserted (instead of disclaiming) these affirmative defenses in 
the district court. 
B. The Argument 
1. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Adjudication of Count One of 
the First Cause Of Action for Abuse of Process Because Appellant Controverted 
Respondents5 Assertion of Prior Settlement of the Claim and Established Disputed 
Material Facts and Genuine Issues In Support of the Cause of Action 
Count one of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process contained in the First 
Amended Complaint alleges that respondent Toscano abused court process in 2008 by 
filing a Chapter 7 petition in behalf of an individual whom respondent knew did not qualify 
for Chapter 7 relief. [CT, Vol. II, 246]. Respondent Toscano claimed in the trial court that 
a January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009) constitutes a prior 
settlement of the claim and that the alleged settlement agreement therefore bars count one 
of the first cause of action for abuse of process. 
In accordance with the rules of summary judgment practice, appellant (plaintiff) 
filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 27, 2009, which 
incorporated a memorandum of points and authorities, a statement controverting 
respondents' statement of undisputed facts, and a statement of disputed facts and genuine 
issues [CT, Vol. II, 209-224]. On August 31, 2009 appellant filed a separate Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition to respondent's motion [CT, Vol. II, 
225] and a Separate Statement of Disputed Facts and Genuine Issues [CT, Vol. II, 234]. 
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Appellant's affidavits contained testimony that respondent Toscano repudiated and 
breached the January 28,2009 settlement agreement (as amended on March 30, 2009) on 
April 10, 2009. The affidavits also contained testimony that appellant notified respondent 
Toscano in writing on April 10, 2009 that appellant had withdrawn his offer to waive 
claims for abuse of process committed by respondent Toscano in 2008 because Toscano 
had repudiated and breached the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended 
March 30, 2009) and demanded unilateral material changes to the parties' agreement. 
Appellant also plainly alleged that he had rejected in writing respondent's altered version 
of the parties' January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009). [CT, 
Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234]. 
Since appellant controverted respondent Toscano's central claim that appellant is 
bound by an effective settlement agreement that obligates appellant to waive his claim for 
abuse of process committed by respondent Toscano in April 2008, the trial court should 
have denied respondent Toscano's motion for summary judgment. On summary judgment 
motion, courts do not decide factual disputes; they simply determine whether there is a 
factual dispute. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). Summary 
judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Adamson v. Multi Cmty. 
Diversified Services, Inc. 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008). And it takes only one 
sworn, good faith affidavit to create a genuine issue of fact in order to preclude summary 
judgment. Holbrook Company v. Adams 542 P.2d 191. 
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2. The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's 
Estate Did Not Bar Count One of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of Process or 
Any Other Cause of Action Contained in First Amended Complaint Because 
Respondents Failed to Assert and Explicitly Waived the Affirmative Defenses of Res 
Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in the Trial Court 
Respondent Toscano filed a unilaterally altered and disputed settlement agreement 
in support of his first motion for summary judgment. In his first motion for summary 
judgment, respondent Toscano claimed that the disputed agreement barred appellant's 
claim against him for abusing Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2008. 
[CT, Vol I, 209]. [Respondent Toscano subsequently alleged in a "consolidated" motion 
for summary judgment that the bankruptcy court's approval of settlement of the debtor's 
estate according to the altered agreement barred appellant's new claims alleged against 
Toscano in the First Amended Complaint for seeking approval of settlement of the estate 
by committing fraud and submitting an "agreement" obtained by fraud]. Yet respondent 
Toscano was also adamant before the trial court that he was not asserting the affirmative 
defenses of res judicata or collateral estoppel and that he in fact rejected the applicability 
of these affirmative defenses to his motion for summary judgment Respondent Toscano 
explicitly waived these affirmative defenses as follows during oral argument of his motion 
for summary judgment: 
Paul Guyon (for defendant Toscano): "So, this is not a question of res judicata. 
It's not a question of collateral estoppel, it's a question that Mr. Billings bargained 
away, whatever claims he may have had, and that boat sailed. Those claims are no 
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longer and for that reason he does not have a right to assert them in this case and 
that's why we're asking for summary judgment." [RT, 8, Lines 5-11].13 
Collateral estoppel (and by analogy, res judicata) are affirmative defenses that must 
be raised by the party seeking their benefits in the trial court, or else they are waived. See, 
e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 35 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 948 (1988).[Holding that collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be 
asserted by the party seeking to benefit from it or it is waived]. Hence, respondent 
Toscano not only waived the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel by 
failing to assert them in the trial court, but he explicitly rejected them, urged the trial court 
to reject them, and he refused to satisfy his burden of proof that he was entitled to assert 
such affirmative defenses to any cause of action contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
Respondent Toscano vigorously elected to disclaim the affirmative defenses of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel and to stand emphatically on his Statement of Undisputed 
Facts. Therefore, the trial court should have simply denied respondents' summary 
judgment motion on the basis of appellant's controverting affidavits in accordance with 
Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra., Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A). 
13
 Appellant, of course, controverted respondent's claim and asserted that Toscano himself 
had repudiated the parties' only legitimate agreement, and that Toscano had submitted a 
fraudulent "agreement" in support of summary judgment. [CT, Vol. II, 209-224; CT, Vol. 
II, 225; CT, Vol. II, 234]. Hence, the parties had stated a well-framed genuine dispute of 
material facts. 
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3. The Federal Bankruptcy Court Order Approving Settlement of a Debtor's 
Estate Did Not In Any Case Satisfy the Requirements of Res Judicata or Collateral 
Estoppel And Even if Respondents had not Waived these Affirmative Defenses, the 
Trial Court Should Have Denied Summary Judgment on the Basis of Appellant's 
Affidavits 
The trial court accepted respondents' express waiver of the affirmative defenses of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel without comment [RT? 8, Lines 5-11] and accordingly 
did not analyze the applicability of the affirmative defenses to respondents' summary 
judgment motion according to governing case law or legal principles of any sort. [CT, Vol. 
II, 398-402 (order after ruling)]. Hence, the trial court should have denied respondents' 
summary judgment motion on the basis of appellant's controverting affidavits in 
accordance with Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra. But the trial court erred by failing to 
follow Holbrook, and it compounded this error by essentially giving respondents the 
benefit of the affirmative defenses, which the court not only failed to analyze according to 
governing principles, but respondents themselves had refused to assert and expressly 
waived. [RT, 8, Lines 5-11]. 
The court under-analyzed and misanalyzed all of the claims alleged in the First 
Amended Complaint and the issues before it as follows: 
"Plaintiffs claims in the First Amended Complaint can be categorized as either (a) 
claims that challenge what happened in the bankruptcy court in order to get that 
court's approval of the settlement agreement, or (b) claims that would be 
extinguished by the settlement agreement." [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 (ruling after 
hearing)]. 
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The ruling contains no analysis of the effect of appellant's controverting affidavits (which 
denied that appellant had entered into the settlement agreement), the law of summary 
judgment (e.g. Holbrook Company v. Adams, supra., Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A).), or the requirements ofres judicata or 
collateral estoppel In fact, the ruling ignores all of appellant's citations to leading cases 
and does not contain a case citation or court rule in support of it. [CT, Vol. II, 398-402 
(ruling after hearing)]. Moreover, the trial court also overlooked in its analysis the fact that 
the bankruptcy court also declared that it had no subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
alleged in the state court action and that it also lacked grounds to enjoin them. Hence, in 
light of all of the bankruptcy court orders, appellant, not respondent, is ultimately entitled 
to summary judgment of at least count two of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of 
Process and the Third Cause of Action for Negligence, which arose from respondents' 
filing of frivolous motions (filed after even the sham settlement agreement was purportedly 
entered into by the parties) to enjoin the April 30, 2009 state court action and remove it to 
federal bankruptcy court.14 
14
 Curiously, the trial court declared that it was aware that the bankruptcy court had 
unequivocally rejected Toscano's motion asserting that the federal court had exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged him. And in light of the trial 
court's own incredulous view of the claims, respondent withdrew them.[RT. 4-5]. Hence, 
the trial court itself identified grounds in the bankruptcy court's rulings for granting 
summary judgment for appellant on at least count two of the First Amended Complaint for 
abusing process in light of Toscano's filing of specious motions, which he instantly 
withdrew in light of the trial court's dim view of them. Of course, Toscano withdrew the 
claims only after refusing to do so upon appellant's request and forcing appellant to travel 
from Shanghai, China to Utah to oppose the motions in federal bankruptcy court and the 
Utah state court at great expense and hardship. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed 
Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. Nothing in even the sham settlement 
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The trial court having ignored respondent Toscano's explicit waiver of the 
affirmative defense of res judicata and collateral estoppel, should, in any case, have 
followed Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corporation 349 U.S. 322 (1953) and denied 
respondents' summary judgment motion. The United States Supreme Court in Lawlor 
rejected a claim advanced there that is nearly identical to the claim, which the trial court 
appears to have advanced for respondent Toscano despite his explicit waiver and 
disclaimer of the affirmative defenses. In Lawler, petitioners brought an antitrust action 
against National Screen and three motion picture producers. Petitioners alleged in their 
1942 action that defendants had conspired to establish a monopoly in the distribution of 
motion picture advertising inasmuch as the producers entered into exclusive licensing 
agreements with National Screen to manufacture and lease such material. The federal 
district court dismissed the 1942 lawsuit with prejudice pursuant to a settlement entered 
into by the parties before trial and ordered defendant National Screen to enter into 
proposed advertising licensing agreements with petitioners. However, the court made no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning petitioners' causes of action or the 
validity of the licensing agreements envisioned by the parties' settlement agreement. 349 
U.S. 322, 327. 
In 1949, petitioners brought a subsequent similar action against the same defendants 
alleging essentially that the settlement of the 1942 suit and that the agreements, which 
agreement submitted by respondents waives appellant's claims for these abuses committed 
by Toscano after the effective date of the alleged settlement agreement. Even the sham 
settlement agreement refers exclusively to the abuse of process committed by Toscano in 
filing an improper Chapter 7 petition in 2008 and the debtor's liability for malicious 
prosecution for filing of a groundless complaint in California. 
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sprang from the settlement were merely bad faith devices, which defendants simply utilized 
to perpetuate anti-trust violations. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the subsequent 
action alleging that the 1942 settlement agreement barred the subsequent action according 
to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district held that some 
features of the subsequent action were barred under principles of res judicata, but others 
were not barred under principles of collateral estoppel The Supreme Court overruled the 
district court's finding that res judicata barred some causes of action contained in 
plaintiffs subsequent action and affirmed the district court's ruling that collateral estoppel 
did not bar any cause of action contained in the new complaint. 
The Supreme Court concurred with the district court that the principles of res 
judicata bar a second trial on the same causes of action that were adjudicated on the 
merits in a prior lawsuit involving the same parties. However, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that a prior judgment is res judicata only as to suits involving the same causes 
of action, and the court disagreed that the subsequent lawsuit involved the same causes of 
action as the initial suit. 349 U.S. 322, 329, 330. The Supreme Court explained further that 
the settlement agreement entered into by the parties in the initial action did not otherwise 
collaterally estoppe plaintiff from bringing new actions pertaining to the same issues as the 
initial action because the action was not tried and the district court did not make findings of 
fact or conclusions of law binding the parties as to any issue, including the legality of the 
license agreements, which sprang from the settlement. 349 U.S. 322, 326, 327. The court 
below concluded that "no question of collateral estoppel by the former judgment 
(settlement) is involved, because the case was never tried, and there was not, therefore, 
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such finding of fact which will preclude the parties to that litigation from questioning the 
finding thereafter;5 and the Supreme Court affirmed 349 U.S. 323-330. 
Under Utah law, res judicata (claim preclusion) does not apply unless three 
requirements are met: (1) [t]he subsequent action must involve the same parties, their 
privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been 
brought or have been available in the first action, and (3) the first action must have 
produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim." See Brigham Young Univ. v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Utah 2005); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline 
Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995), and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 16 P.3d 
1214 (Utah 2000). Collateral Estoppel (issue preclusion) does not apply, unless four 
elements are satisfied: (1) [t]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have 
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (3) the 
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Brigham Young Univ. v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., supra; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., supra, and 
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Newavs, Inc. supra. 
Here, there is no question that approval of settlement of the debtor's estate did not 
constitute a judgment on the merits of any cause of action alleged in the First Amended 
Complaint. Indeed, the bankruptcy court declared its lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
over this state court action, and the bankruptcy court did not consider any of the claims 
currently alleged in the First Amended Complaint. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed 
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Facts); CT, Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
and the Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules]. Moreover, respondent Toscano was 
not a party in the bankruptcy court proceeding. 
Similarly, there is no question that the bankruptcy court did not try or litigate any 
cause of action involving the same issues as any cause of action alleged in the First 
Amended Complaint; nor did the bankruptcy court issue any sort of findings of fact or 
conclusions of law binding the parties as to any issue relevant to any cause of action 
contained in the First Amended Complaint. Indeed, the bankruptcy court did not even 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on any issue pertaining to any cause of action contained in 
the First Amended Complaint. Presumably, this is precisely why respondent Toscano 
denied that his motion for summary judgment depended in the least upon principles of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel and he elected to disclaim these affirmative defenses and 
stand exclusively on the Statement of Undisputed Facts, which he filed in support of his 
motion for summary judgment of the original complaint. 15 
What's more, the second and third counts of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of 
Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of Action for 
15
 Respondent Toscano filed a sham version of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement 
(as amended on March 30, 2009) on April 15, 2009 for the court's approval. Appellant 
immediately filed objections. The court set August 20, 2009 for a hearing on the 
objections. But inexplicably the court refused to allow appellant to lay a foundation and to 
introduce documentary evidence (pre-marked and lodged with the court clerk) to 
demonstrate that respondent Toscano had repudiated and breached the January 28, 2009 
settlement agreement (as amended March 30, 2009) and had submitted a sham document 
containing unilateral changes to the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended 
March 30, 2009) on April 15, 2009. [CT, Vol. II, 366 (Affidavit of Disputed Facts); CT, 
Vol. II, 378, Request for Judicial Notice of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the 
Debtor's Chapter 7 Petition and Schedules] 
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Negligence are each predicated, upon misconduct committed by defendant Toscano after 
Menu* • . :*>•- i,;c eiicciivL uak ol me alleged settlement agreement). Respondent 
summary adjudication of the foregoing causes of action. But Toscano nevertheless appears 
to claim that the sham version of the January 28, 2009 settlement agreement (as amended 
and filed in support of summary j udgment of the orig WA1 • r. p! ; •+ \r\\ :<.-' \M * 
committed by Toscano after the effective date of the alleged agreement (March 30, 2009) 
and for anv acts that he might still c vmmit in the future. But not even the sham,, settlement 
atint merit which deferh f i • - !i 
an incredible provision. And ! oseann did not oxen attempt to support thib claim wiiL a 
Statement ot Lndispuku i ^i> lvespondcnt simply asked the trial court to abandon even a 
. • *• . uled Complaint foi 
post March 30, 2009 misconduct on a summary judgment motion without supporting 
evidence of any kind, (much less undisputed evidence). 
rl 1 le trial c ::>i n t indeed < iolated di le j:: i ocess of la • < v li sn it acquiesced and granted 
summary judgment of claims, which appellant has never had an opportunity to fairly and 
fully litigate before any tribunal. The trial court should not have uiven res judicata and 
collatei al estoppel effect to tl: le I: at lki ijptc;> cour I: oi der settling L_ dc;.^.i > c>.,;;^  because 
respondent explicitly disclaimed these affirmative defenses and the oi dei in ait) « case did 
not satisfy the requirements of these special defenses. Ilierefore, the trial court should 
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haw denied respondents' motion for sum.iiiaryjudg.niei.it on the basis of appellant's 
controverting aiiidavits. 
4. Respondents F ailed to F ile a Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of 
Summary Adjudication of Counts Two and Three of the First Cause of Action for 
Abuse of Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, and the Third Cause of 
Action for Negligence Contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
Appellant has demonstrated that respondents taiiu.imi^ a Statement rtf 
summary judgment of the First Amended Complaint. In response to appellant's First 
Amended Comprint, respondent Toscano simply -Hied i novel motion on September \n, 
1 : : 
original complain:*'
 L^t ,
 l u . . n • • •? = ; >f respondents' loreiioinu failure, 
appellant objected in writing N» ihe L<HUI consideration of Toseano's second nu^im for 
sumi iiai y . ^.r . , ..;-*_.,u ;^ ^:.;;)i.^ 1 1.1 3 1 / 3 49, n 2] 
s
- :"M".41ant has also demonstrated that th/- * -' \* - plaint contained t vv c tie \¥ 
and entirely distinct counts of abuse of process (counts two and three of the first cause of 
actiwii) ana aOu,..,,„ii causes of duHm ,,.; .raud (second cause of action) and for 
entirely new, separate, and distinct from the facts alleged in support of the original 
complaint for a single count of abuse of process. And ^ddi new cause of action alleged 
misco iu l i u I i*(iiii 11 ii I in, mi 111 Il I , iii ,|Ni, imidtiil i i l ' ln the ; i l lq>oi l r l t n lis v dale of I h r S1II„IIII 
settlement agreement, which respondent filed i;*.-- . •< *u of his motion for summary 
judgment of the original complaint [CT Vol. II. 1:40-261]. Respondents, nevertheless, 
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simply moved the court to consider its original summary judgment motion as a motion 
for summary judgment ui inc enine i HM \mended v. Miipiamt [< 1. \ oi. li. JUO-M<>| . 
summary adjudication of counts two and three of the First Cause of Action for Abuse of 
Process, the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, or the Third Cause of Action for 
346]. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Sect; .t "fc)(3)(A) ••: • !. . : < ' • " ^ 
\ iv.emoranduni supporiirm a not ion \c\ v*mmar> ludginei * " oniain a 
statement of material facts as to which the mo\ ing part> contends no uermme issue 
e \ i ^ : s . . . . . . \ - * S P - : *•= " •:••• • • • • . - i , -
•**
 ;;!c^ r :\y ,. >U'ji as amui-Aiis oi . i^covery materials, i ach tact set .onii in 
the nun ing part) s memorandum is deemed admitted l«-r the purpose r-f summary 
judgment unless controverted fay the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
! ' * i . 
,TAv>^v,vu, on motion for summ '*-• * -; Miuii, the moving party "bears the initial burden of 
making a prima facie demonstration oi the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and 
• i • \\ iiue^el v. ^engenpergci. -.. ^ i .. *• 7 
(10th Cir. 2000). Respondent Toscano failed to even attempt to satisfy this imu- v-i 
with respect to counts two arid three of the First Cause of Actioi foi \buse of Process, the 
Second Cause of Action foi I raud, and the ' I hird Cause of i I cU .» MM segligence. 
Therefore thr tn.il I'OM'I Ji >iild h;iw dunn l h>s< .mo , molion i u iiinuiiiio nlfinln .iliun 
of these claims in light of his failure to satisfy the prima facie and procedural requirements 
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of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Section 7 (c)(3)(A) and Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 
F.3d861/ J 
5. t iic 1 rial Court Should Have Denied Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the First Amended Complaint Because Appellant Filed Sufficient 
Affidavits to Establish a Genuine Factual Dispute Concerning Claims that Toscano 
Asserted a Settlement Agreement Obtained by Fraud in Support of Summary 
Judgment 
of Process and the Second Cause of Action for Fraud allege that the bankruptcy court 
order (settling the debtor's estate) was itself obtained through respondents" fraud .JMJ 
M \ : ' - V. •.:!•. . . • • All , L . e - JLU: • ;>; . ~ . p i > : : ^ I U S 
for (1) obtaining the order itself through malfeasance ami (2) coinmiuiniT frai^ rjainst 
appellant h) repudiating the parties' legitimate settlement agreement after appellant 
:• . -V'I, .*, .. ^a ih ' ^ iu J . ; ' . , ... ,)Li.iU\*. damages with prejudice, . iiese v»aniis 
have never been considered u V . • 
dismissal pursuant to res judicata or col lateral estoppel, even if respondents had actually 
asserteu < ;,..uu, , • * A\scidu\\iu±i uie.ic aim mauve delenses m tlu diMiict court. 
Appellant filed a detailed affidavit outlining the continuing fraud committed by 
respondent' Foscano | • lerelbre. the trial court, should have denied 
' l o s f . t l l u p , i l i i o l l i i i i i ( i r i l i i l i l i i , i i ) | l i l i ^ l 1 1 t 1 l 1 i i U l S i l i l l i III i I ^ , n p i i ( l i c i i l t ' i l l i | ) i ) h 1 l l i i n l i i l i l l t 
settlement agreement. Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity & Guarantee Insurance. 
Underwriters 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965), 
16
 Appellant nevertheless filed exhaustive affidavits, which established genuine disputed 
facts as to each claim alleged in the Firsl Amended Cmnplaini !' Y. Vol II. 209-224; CT, 
Vol II, 225; CT, Vol II, 234]. 
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VII 
~ ~ I'LUSION 
in iigiii ot the foregoing, appelant;espcctfUlly requests that the court reverse the 
February 24, 2010. Appellant also respectfully requests that the court award costs of 
appeal. 
5* Kipectftill^ Submitted, 
Joseph Billings 
Appellant, In Pro Per 
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ADDENDUM 
rh|n*Jud«rfa» District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C(lMty J 2QQ3 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA^LT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENTAL, umcbui&Y 
JOSEPH BILLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAUL TOSCANO, etal, 
Defendants, 
RULING 
Case No. 090907164 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Date: October 27,2009 
^PUtyoBrtT 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Consolidate and 
for Summary Judgment and for Fees and Costs.* Having fully considered the Motions: 
(1) Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and 
(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in that claims axe DISMISSED, but 
dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE in the ovQiit Plaintiff prevails in his appeal to the U.S. District 
Court of Judge Bouiden's August 29,,J Order. 
/. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Improper Service 
Defendants argued their Motion to Dismiss at the hearing on September 1,2009. At the hearing, the 
Court indicated that the Motion to Dismiss lacked merit. The Court remains convinced that Motion to 
Dismiss should be denied. First, regardless of defects in the first service of process, it appears that 
Defendants have now been properly served. Second, tlae Court concludes, and Defendants concede, that this 
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action.2 
1
 Defendants' original Morion for Summary Judgment discussed how the claims raised in die 
Complaint were extinguished by a settlement and order in Bankruptcy Court, Plaintiff has now filed 
a First Amended Complaint and Defendants responded with die present Motion for Summary 
Judgment Because Defendants have reasserted die arguments from die first Motion that remain 
applicable to the First Amended Complaint, the second Motion for Summary Judgment supercedes 
the first and die Court will only address die second Motion. 
2In any event, Mr. Toscano appeared in Court and,filed motions seeking substantive relief. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Mr. Toscano has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this 
Court, 
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2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
h his First Amended Complaint,3 Plaintiff raises three claims for abuse of process, a claim for fraud, 
and a claim for negligence. 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff s claims were extinguished by Judge Boulden's August 20, 2009 
Order in Bankruptcy Court which accepted the parties' settlement agreement The settlement agreement 
stated that "the Parties hereby mutually release each other from any and all claims, debts, obligations, 
actions, demands, . . , , including any actions for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, whether 
grounded in law or equity, whether known or unknown,,. ."Order Approving Settlement among Debtor 
Antoinette Billings, Debtor's Counsel, JosephM. Billings, John H. Billings, and Chapter 7 Trustee Elizabeth 
R. Loveridge, Exhibit 1 at f 4. Plaintiff asserts that he did not agree to the settlement which was approved 
by the Bankruptcy Court. Instead, he says that Defendants fraudulently presented the settlement to Judge 
Boulden. At the hearing on September 1,2009, Plaintiff represented that he had attempted to raise the fraud 
issue to Judge Boulden, but was unsuccessful. Also on September 1, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 
challenging Judge Boulden's Order. Notably, Plaintiffdid not request that either Judge Boulden or the U. S. 
District Court stay the effect of the Order pending appeal. 
Plaintiffs claims in the First Amended Complaint can be categorized as either (a) claims that 
challenge what happened before the Bankruptcy Court in order to get that Court's approval of the settlement 
agreement, or (b) claims that would be extinguished by the settlement agreement. 
3
 The First Amended Complaint is properly before the Court because, although Defendants 
had filed motions for summary judgment and dismissal, the Court had not ruled on those motions 
when die First Amended Complaint was filed. Additionally, Defendants had not yet filed their 
responsive pleading. See Utah of Civil Procedure 15(a). 
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As the Court intimated at the September 1,2009 hearing, Plaintiff cannot collaterally attack in this 
Court the Banlcruptcy Court's decision to approve the settlement Plaintiffs relief from that Order, if any, 
must come from the Bankruptcy Court or from the reviewing District Court.4 This Court must accept the 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the settlement is acceptable; it will not consider argument regarding the 
enforceability of a settlement agreementfthat another Court has ratified. Therefore, all of Plaintiffs claims 
that challenge the court-approved settlement itself must be dismissed. Those issues are reserved solely to 
the Banlcruptcy Court or the District Court on appeal. 
Moreover, as long as Judge Boulden's August 20,2009 Order stands, it is also not appropriate for 
this Court to consider those claims by Plaintiff that are/were extinguished by the terms of the settlement 
agreement. Those claims must also be dismissed. 
However, because there is an appeal pending or Judge Boulden's August 29, 2009 Order, the 
dismissal of the claims is granted without prejudice to Plaintiff in the event he prevails on his appeal to the 
District Court on those issues. 
Finally, Defendants have provided no authority to support their claim of entitlement to attorney's fees 
and costs. Their request is denied. 
4U.S District Court No. 09-828 (Campbell, J,) 
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ORDER 
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
(2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims are 
DISMISSED. However, because the matter is under appeal, DISMISSAL IS WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE in the event Plaintiff prevails on appeal to District Court of Judge Boulden's 
August 29,2009 Order. 
(3) Defendants' request for fees and costs is DENIED. 
DATED this 27 day of October, 2009, 
Judge Denise/PnsjHHtJerg 
District Court Judge 
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Toscano P 
SALT LAKE 
(Transcrib 
may not b 
THE 
f Jot 
.C. 
appearances. 
motion? 
please. 
represent 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
seph Bi 
CITY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 1, 2009 
JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG 
er's note: speaker identification 
e accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
We're on the record on Case No. 
llings vs. Paul James Toscano and Pa 
If I could have parties and counsel state 
GUYON: 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
Thank you, Judge. Shall I argue my 
Well, first state your appearance 
Oh, okay, I'm sorry. Peter Guyon 
LUl 
your 
ing Mr. Toscano and Paul Toscano, a professional 
corporation. 
Billings, 
THE 
And 
MR. 
COURT: Thank you. 
you are Mr. Billings? 
BILLINGS: Yes, good morning Your Honor, Joseph 
plaintiff. 
THE 
Toscano is al 
which was 
go back. 
All 
fil( 
We 
COURT: 
30 pres 
right. 
sd as a 
first h 
All right, thank you. All right, 
ent. 
Mr. 
We have several motions, the latest of 
request for an expedited - well, let me 
ad the issues about whether 
1 
1 or not the present motion should be dismissed for lack of 
2 personal jurisdiction and I have subject matter jurisdiction 
3 and then most recently then there was a memo and motion filed 
4 for an expedited hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
5 the response to which I only received this morning from Mr. 
6 Billings but I have reviewed it. I don't know when you 
7 received that response? 
8 MR. GUYON: I just received it about 10 minutes 
9 ago, Judge. 
10 THE COURT: Do you need additional time to -
11 MR. GUYON: No, I'd be happy to argue the summary 
12 judgment motion. I'm prepared to do so. 
13 THE COURT: All right. These are your motions, so 
14 you can proceed to the podium. 
15 MR. GUYON: Thank you, Judge. I'd like to, if I 
16 may with leave of the Court, I'd like to discuss the issue of 
17 jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction first and there's a 
18 number of facts which I believe are undisputed. On April 30, 
19 2009 a gentleman appeared at Mr. Toscano's office and 
20 attempted apparently to serve him — 
21 THE COURT: Let me shorten this whole discussion 
22 because I've looked at that and whether or not the first 
23 service was deficient which it appears it might have been, 
24 the second service which was made, although I have a second 
25 affidavit from Mr. Toscano, I also have an affidavit from the 
1 constable that is entitled to a strong presumption of 
2 regularity and clearly states that Mr. Toscano was served 
3 personally with not only the complaint but the summons as 
4 well. So, this is not obviously an evidentiary hearing but 
5 that's, you know, that presumption of regularity that 
6 attaches to the constable's return of service is something 
7 that I want to address there. I don't think we need to worry 
8 about the first service. 
9 MR. GUYON: Okay. And thank you for the 
10 opportunity to respond to that. In the first place, I have 
11 not been served with a copy of the affidavit of the constable 
12 which I believe is Mr. Billings responsibility to serve upon 
13 me, so I have not seen that. 
14 THE COURT: Oh, I did not realize that you hadn't 
15 seen that. 
16 MR. GUYON: Right. So, from our standpoint, that 
17 is not before the Court because it wasn't served on opposing 
18 counsel which Mr. Billings is obliged to do if he intends to 
19 utilize that in connection with his arguments. 
20 THE COURT: It was filed by the process server in 
21 this matter. 
22 MR. GUYON: Right, but certainly Mr. Billings would 
23 have control of his process server and should have served it 
24 on me, but did not. And I don't believe that there's any 
25 kind of a certificate of service showing service upon me. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE 
MR. 
the Court. 
THE 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
COURT: 
Let me see. 
So I don't think that's properly before 
Okay. Yeah, I do not see a certificate 
of service attached to these documents. All I have is the 
file date of June 1 in my court's file. 
MR. GUYON: I'd be happy to move onto the Motion 
for Summary Judgment if that's agreeable with the Court. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
Go ahead. 
Judge, you'll notice in our summary 
judgment motion we have filed an order from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court — 
THE COURT: 
service and your init: 
argument that was not 
I'm sorry, before we leave the issue of 
Lai Motion to Dismiss, you also had an 
terribly persuasive but I'm assuming 
you've abandoned about subject matter jurisdiction. 
MR. GUYON: 
best to withdraw that 
Judge ' wouldn' 1 
THE 
She did rule 1 
MR. 
Right. I think it probably would be 
because the United States Bankruptcy 
b rule on the issue and — 
COURT: 
bhat she 
GUYON: 
So I'll withdraw that 
THE 
cancels yours 
COURT: ' 
Well, she did more than not rule on it. 
didn't have jurisdiction. 
She took the position contrary to mine. 
motion. 
feah, which (inaudible), yeah. Okay 
4 
1 MR. GUYON: I have no problem withdrawing that, 
2 withdrawing that motion — 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. GUYON: - at the present time. 
5 THE COURT: It would have been denied anyway on 
6 that basis but that's all right. 
7 MR. GUYON: I understand and I don't want to take 
8 up the Court's time just for — 
9 THE COURT: I just want to make sure we've dotted 
10 the Ai's and crossed the At's. 
11 MR. GUYON: Right. Now, should I proceed on the 
12 Motion for Summer Judgment? 
13 THE COURT: You may, I'm sorry. 
14 MR. GUYON: Now, the reason, the reason this was 
15 brought and the reason it was done when it was done is that 
16 we didn't know these facts until the Bankruptcy Court had 
17 ruled on August 20 and you'll notice all my pleadings were 
18 filed on August 21st. So that was the first opportunity I 
19 had to bring this to the Court's attention that on the 
20 merits, the complaint, there is no claim because Mr. Billings 
21 agreed that there was no claim and that was decided by the 
22 U.S. Bankruptcy Court and I have a certified copy of the 
23 amended order if I could, if the Court would like that. I 
24 didn't have time to file a certified order with the motion, 
25 but I have one. If I could approach I'd give it to the 
1 
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20 
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22 
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25 
Court. Thank 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
you. 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
COURT: 
Settlement Agreement 
in her draft order I 
incorporating 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
Have you premarked it? 
Pardon me? 
Have you premarked it? 
Oh, I didn't mark it. 
And this includes the attachment of the 
that Judge Boulden had attached to her -
thought she had indicated she was 
by reference the agreement of the parties. 
GUYON: 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
Right. 
Yes, it's here. 
And the agreement itself as I have 
pointed out in the Motion for Summary Judgment is very very 
specific about the c'. 
marked 
Laims that - excuse me, I should have 
this and I didn't - in my memorandum in support of 
summary judgment I've drawn the Court's attention to a couple 
of items of language 
One is 
support 
THE 
MR. 
that MJ 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
r. Bill. 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
: of defendant 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
GUYON: 
from the — 
What page are you at? 
— that are pertinent to this motion 
Lngs — 
I'm sorry. What page are you on? 
I'm on Page 2 of my memorandum in 
rs motion for summary judgment. 
Okay. 
At Paragraph 3, that is that Mr. 
6 
1 Billings, pro se, was clearly a party to that agreement and 
2 "that the parties release each other against the others and 
3 any and all claims and causes of action extend among them" 
4 and this specifically says "including claims and causes of 
5 action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against 
6 the debtor and debtor's counsel." And that's the second 
7 paragraph. 
8 And I'd also point out to the Court that right 
9 under that, "for good and valuable consideration, (inaudible) 
10 sufficiency which are acknowledged, including the exchange of 
11 mutual releases and all claims and causes of action including 
12 claims and causes of action for malicious prosecution and 
13 abuse of process against the debtor and debtor's counsel." 
14 And then the agreement says as I pointed out on 
15 Page 2, "This agreement is subject to approval by the United 
16 States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah" and then 
17 the last paragraph on that page clearly states, "effective 
18 upon the performance of the obligations in Paragraphs 2 and 3 
19 above, the parties hereby mutually release each other." I 
20 won't read all of that but down near the middle it says 
21 "including any action, (cough) excuse me, for abuse of 
22 process or malicious prosecution." And I'd simply point out 
23 to the Court that the complaint on file here is styled as one 
24 against Mr. Toscano and his corporation for abuse of process. 
25 So my argument is that those claims and causes of 
1 action that Mr. Billings asserts in the complaint in this 
2 case were clearly and unequivocally given away, resolved, 
3 settled by him in the Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy 
4 Court confirmed that which is evidenced by the certified 
5 order that I've given you. So, this is not a question of res 
6 judicata. It's not a question of collateral estoppel, it's a 
7 question that Mr. Billings bargained away, whatever claims he 
8 may have had and that boat sailed, those claims are no longer 
9 and for that reason, he does not have a right to assert them 
10 in this case and that's why we're asking for summary 
11 judgment. 
12 Does the Court have any questions of me? 
13 THE COURT: No. 
14 MR. GUYON: Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Billings. 
16 MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. I guess with 
17 respect to the jurisdiction issues, it seems to me that even 
18 putting aside the constable's affidavit, that the appearance 
19 and the motions brought by counsel today pretty much make all 
20 that moot. In other words, he submitted to the jurisdiction, 
21 so therefore, that question is decided. I've actually never 
22 seen the affidavit other than an email copy. So I was under 
23 no obligation to serve it to him. I never even had the 
24 document. It's evidence that he was served and as the Court 
25 properly notes, it's entitled to a presumption of 
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correctness. So I don't think there's any question in th 
first place that Mr. Toscano was properly served. 
But 
evidence that 
in any case, even despite the overwhelming 
he was properly served, here he is and now 
they're moving the Court for affirmative relief. So the 
positions are 
is obliged at 
e 
two 
absolutely inconsistent. So I think the Court 
this point to simply acknowledge that there 's 
proper service and the Court has personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant. 
As far as the summary judgment motion goes, if 
Court is at all inclined to even consider that motion or 
grant that motion now, I would request a continuance — 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Why? 
BILLINGS: Well, it seems -
COURT: You've taken the time to respond — 
BILLINGS: Yes, yes. 
the 
to 
COURT: You've had the opportunity to respond. 
So I'm not seeing how you would be - how your - the basis 
why you would 
MR. 
need a continuance. 
BILLINGS: The basis would be so I could c] 
it up. I mean, I've had almost no notice of this, email 
notice and it 
willing to go 
arguments but 
wasn't even properly served. I mean, I'm 
ahead and proceed here and make certain 
what I haven't had an opportunity to do is 
certified records that would further support my position. 
> for 
_ean 
get 
In 
9 
1 other words, to make my position completely controlling it 
2 seems to me, a certified transcript of the Court's proceeding 
3 in the Bankruptcy Court would pretty much decide it. 
4 THE COURT: Well, the proceedings are irrelevant 
5 with - I mean, the order, the signed order by the court is 
6 what controls, not what may have been said in the 
7 proceedings. It's the order that the court adopts as its 
8 final expression of judgment and order. 
9 MR. BILLINGS: That's why this is clearly a case of 
10 either - I mean, I think defense counsel misunderstands the 
11 issues here. If that's the Court's position, if that 
12 defendant's position, then it clearly is a case of either it 
13 has to be either a case of res judicata or collateral 
14 estoppel. You don't just have an agreement that appears out 
15 of nowhere and it is offered to the court as a judgment. A 
16 Settlement Agreement, in order for that Settlement Agreement 
17 to - well, let's put it this way then, if the Court is taking 
18 the position that the — 
19 THE COURT: Why isn't an order adopted pursuant to 
20 a Settlement Agreement, negotiated by the parties and adopted 
21 as an order of the Court, not - which it clearly has been 
22 here by Judge Boulden, why is that not an adjudication on the 
23 merits that is conclusive? 
24 MR. BILLINGS: Now, there's a lot of confusion 
25 here. You've got two things going here that are confused. 
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If you're 
Court is 
j going to proceed as if the order in the Bankruptcy 
irre. 
THE 
irrelevant. 
Court — 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
of what may h< 
ultimate 
What this 
Levant — 
COURT: Not, they're not saying it's 
BILLINGS: You did. 
COURT: They're submitting to it. 
BILLINGS: You did. If you said the Bankruptcy 
COURT: No, no, what I said is the discussion 
ave been said as part of a transcript is not the 
determinant of what this Court gives weight to. 
5 COU rt gives weight to is what the judgment of the 
other court is as reflected in a judgment and order signed by 
the judge. 
not what 
MR. 
THE 
may 1 
to be submitt 
to - not that 
BILLINGS: In that case -
COURT: That's what is binding on this Court, 
have been said that would require a transcript 
ed to this Court. That was what I was intending 
the proceedings were irrelevant, that whatever 
discussions may have occurred in the course of whatever 
hearing, if any, was held before Judge Boulden, is not 
controlling. 
that you' 
In order 
MR. 
re 1 
for 
It's the order that's controlling. 
BILLINGS: All right. Well, it does look to me 
ooking at this then as a matter of res judicata. 
that judgment, settlement to have a res judicata 
11 
1 affect in this Court, it's extremely important what the Court 
2 did there. In other words, for it to have res judicata 
3 affect, it has to be a judgment on the same cause of action 
4 against the same parties as in this case. Clearly — 
5 THE COURT: Not all. It must include the parties 
6 to this proceeding. It does not have to mean that it also 
7 applies to the other parties in the other proceeding. 
8 MR. BILLINGS: I'm not sure I understand that 
9 point. What matters is — 
10 THE COURT: The issue here is I have you and I have 
11 Mr. Toscano and Mr. Toscano's professional corporation. 
12 MR. BILLINGS: Right. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. All three individuals or 
14 entities, okay, the two individuals and the entity were all 
15 present and parties to the Settlement Agreement and to the 
16 litigation in the federal court, in the Bankruptcy Court. 
17 MR. BILLINGS: I'm really not - nothing of this at 
18 this point really turns on the parties. What really matters 
19 because the Courts actually have relaxed a little bit, it 
20 seems to me, the requirement that it be the same parties. I 
21 mean it is true that the defendant, Toscano, was not a party 
22 to those proceedings. 
23 THE COURT: But you -
24 MR. BILLINGS: But that's not the real issue. 
25 THE COURT: Yeah, you agreed to include actions in 
12 
1 the settlement that — 
2 MR. BILLINGS: We have to put that aside for a 
3 moment. 
4 THE COURT: Why? 
5 MR. BILLINGS: Because first we have to decide 
6 whether we have a judgment that's entitled to res judicata 
7 (inaudible). That's the first issue. And that issue has to 
8 be decided on the following basis, a judgment is not entitled 
9 to res judicata effect unless it is a judgment on the merits 
10 of the same cause of actions brought in that court as the 
11 same cause of action brought in this court and that's clearly 
12 not the case. We had absolutely no judgment on any question 
13 of the merits of the abuse of process claims, named in Count 
14 1 of the First Amended Complaint. So res judicata clearly 
15 does not apply. It doesn't turn on the presence of the 
16 parties. It turns on the fact that there was no judgment in 
17 the Federal District Court on the merits of the abuse of 
18 process claims brought in this court, (cough) excuse me, on 
19 the first count of abuse of process. That's out, clearly. 
20 Now, the only real question — 
21 THE COURT: Okay. I'm not sure I'm -
22 MR. BILLINGS: The only real question here and it's 
23 not a real question either, is whether collateral estoppel 
24 applies. Now collateral estoppel is different than res 
25 judicata, as you know. 
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1 THE COURT: Should have or could have been. 
2 MR. BILLINGS: No, the issue there on collateral 
3 estoppel would be is whether the court made any findings on 
4 some other cause of action that somehow binded the parties on 
5 an issue that some cause of action in this court depends 
6 upon. That's how collateral estoppel works. That also 
7 clearly did not happen. In fact, the Court was emphatic that 
8 it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
9 It was emphatic that it was not going to enjoin this action 
10 and simply approved the debtor's disposition of her estate. 
11 But the court clearly made absolutely no findings about any 
12 issue that pertains to the First Amended Complaint - sorry, 
13 to the First Count, Count 1 of Abuse of Process of the First 
14 Amended Complaint. So even collateral estoppel does not 
15 apply. There as no hearing on that issue. 
16 Now, as far as - so it seems to me there's 
17 absolutely not res judicata effect to that judgment. I'm not 
18 collaterally estopped from proceeding in this court and just 
19 as a simply matter of summary judgment, I have clearly stated 
20 in affidavits before the court under penalty of perjury that 
21 the document that Defendant Toscano and his counsel are 
22 presenting to this Court, is an absolute fraud and I can 
23 prove it. I wouldn't have come here from Shanghai, China if 
24 this was just some sort of personality conflict with 
25 defendants. Defendant Toscano has abused process in an 
14 
1 extremely serious way. He got nervous about what he did in 
2 the Federal Bankruptcy Court and so he became very reckless 
3 in how he attempted to resolve it. 
4 I drafted the Settlement Agreement that was 
5 ultimately patched together and changed by Defendant Toscano 
6 when he presented it to the Bankruptcy Court and to this 
7 Court and I'm telling the Court again and I'll swear under 
8 penalty of perjury again, that Settlement Agreement is a 
9 fraud. I've never agreed - it's not true that I never agreed 
10 but I certainly advised him in light of his breaches of 
11 contract, in light of his unilateral changes that he made to 
12 the agreement, that I was no longer willing to waive any 
13 claims against him for anything. 
14 So as a matter of summary judgment, the mere fact 
15 that I've contradicted and controverted the only issue that 
16 he's raising here, i.e. that he's entitled to some sort of 
17 waiver of the claims, is clearly contradicted. So the Court 
18 is precluded from granting any sort of summary judgment on 
19 that issue. To make it very clear, (sneeze) excuse me, the 
20 document which counsel just submitted to the Court is a 
21 fraud. 
22 THE COURT: It is a document that was signed, 
23 presumably signed by you. 
24 MR. BILLINGS: No, I didn't sign it. That's should 
25 be a clear sign, a very clear sign of what's going on here. 
15 
1 You'll never find my signature on any of those documents. He 
2 changed that document in very serious ways, very important 
3 ways. It completely undermined the value of the settlement 
4 and now he's submitted it to you and he also submitted it in 
5 the same form to the Bankruptcy Court. It's a fraud and I 
6 can prove it. 
7 THE COURT: Why are you here instead of before 
8 Judge Boulden? 
9 MR. BILLINGS: Well, I was in front of Judge 
10 Boulden as well but Judge Boulden - it's hard to figure out 
11 exactly - if we want to get into the mind of the tribunal 
12 it's a little bit difficult to say but — 
13 THE COURT: Wait. It seems to me that as a first 
14 matter, that's an issue - if you are asserting under penalty 
15 of perjury that there's been a fraud upon the court -
16 MR. BILLINGS: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: - then we start with a fraud upon Judge 
18 Boulden's Court. 
19 MR. BILLINGS: We sure do and I can prove that and 
20 that's part of one of my causes of action in the - I believe 
21 it's my third cause of action - second cause of action of the 
22 First Amended Complaint. The fact of the matter is, as far 
23 as I can tell, Judge Boulden wanted to simply wash her hands 
24 of these abuse of process claims and what she really wanted 
25 to do was just get the debtor's estate settled. But we did 
16 
1 not - she did not take evidence on the issue of fraud. She 
2 did not take evidence on the issue and she refused any sort 
3 of evidence on this issue, on the question of whether or not 
4 the terms of conditions that Defendant Toscano included in 
5 that Settlement Agreement were accurate. So that matter 
6 cannot be res judicata. In other words, I've never had -
7 that's the key here, I have never had a day in court — 
8 THE COURT: Well, the document that I have in front 
9 of me, a certified copy of the court's order and judgment 
10 includes as an attachment that it incorporates by reference, 
11 an agreement that while it doesn't carry your physical 
12 signature, it carries a notation that indicates a signature. 
13 MR. BILLINGS: I refuted - I'm not sure what you're 
14 referring to there. I haven't seen this document. The key 
15 issue is that issue was never decided in the - that's why 
16 it's not collateral estoppel. 
17 THE COURT: You and I may have some disagreements 
18 on how you and I read that matter but — 
19 MR. BILLINGS: May I approach? 
20 THE COURT: You may. Now, I don't know what the 
21 original document carries. All I know is that that is a 
22 notation that signifies that an original signature has been 
23 secured at some point. 
24 MR. BILLINGS: It never was. Here's what was 
25 secured at one point is that on January 28 I wrote an email 
17 
1 authorization to approval of a January 28th Settlement 
2 Agreement. The agreement that you have before you is 
3 Defendant Toscano's cut and pasted, fraudulently created 
4 version of the agreement that I sent to him on January 28th 
5 and agreed to be bound by according to those terms and 
6 conditions. That's why you don't see my signature on there. 
7 He changed in very material ways, that Settlement Agreement 
8 and then presented it to the court without my signature. 
9 None of that was litigated in Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
10 And in any case, even it had been litigated there, 
11 here's really a key, even if it had been litigated there for 
12 purposes of summary judgment motion, any settlement that was 
13 obtained pursuant to fraud, in other words, if you want to 
14 disagree with me about the fact that this does not qualify as 
15 collateral estoppel, you would still have to agree with me, 
16 it seems to me, that the case law is very clear that any 
17 settlement obtained through fraud is ineffective and that is 
18 the allegation that I'm making here which would also defeat 
19 summary judgment. 
20 So not only does this case not satisfy res 
21 judicata, not satisfy any of the requirements of collateral 
22 estoppel, it also is based entirely upon a fraudulently 
23 obtained Settlement Agreement that I never signed. I've 
24 never had a day in court on this. Mr. Toscano has committed 
25 very serious offenses — 
18 
1 THE COURT: Have you filed an appeal of Judge 
2 Boulden — 
3 MR. BILLINGS: I'm trying to - if necessary I'm 
4 going to. We just had the hearing the other day, the 20th. 
5 THE COURT: Ten days ago. 
6 MR. BILLINGS: Yes, so there's still time to 
7 appeal. I frankly don't even think it's necessary to appeal 
8 and I'm trying to work this thing out, nobody is quite 
9 reasonable over here on defense table. If I can work this 
10 out without the appeal, that would be great. Frankly, I 
11 don't think I even have to appeal it but just to be safe and 
12 to be sure, perhaps I will. I am inclined to do it just to 
13 be safe but as I say, even if I don't appeal, it wouldn't 
14 matter because res judicata and collateral estoppel don't 
15 apply even if it was a valid judgment. The issue here isn't 
16 whether it was a valid judgment in the court, the issue in 
17 the Federal Bankruptcy Court, the issue here is whether it's 
18 entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in 
19 this court. That's the issue. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear from Mr. Guyon. 
21 MR. GUYON: Judge, all of these arguments that Mr. 
22 Billings has brought before you today, were argued before the 
23 Bankruptcy Court on August 20th. All these allegations of 
24 fraud, all these allegations of "I didn't sign the 
25 agreement," all of these allegations of every kind were 
19 
1 brought up on August 20 and disposed of as the Court can see 
2 in the form of this order that the judge signed and the judge 
3 prepared, I might add. 
4 Now, as we sit here today, I mean, this is really a 
5 novel approach to things and Mr. Billings really is arguing 
6 even if, even if the judge over in the Bankruptcy Court says, 
7 rejected all my arguments of fraud on the court and fraud by 
8 Mr. Toscano and fraud by everybody else and she didn't buy 
9 those and she's going to enforce this agreement on me which I 
10 entered into verbally in April of this year - and let me add 
11 that. There was a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court in 
12 April at which Mr. Billings and his brother attended and all 
13 the parties to that agreement and they verbally agreed to 
14 this, even though they hadn't signed it and even though they 
15 had filed all kinds of objections or whatever it was they 
16 filed and all that was taken into account by Judge Boulden on 
17 August 20. So that's kind of a fate'acompli. I don't think 
18 Mr. Billings gets to enter into an enforceable agreement in 
19 the Bankruptcy Court and then come to this Court and say 
20 well, that didn't mean anything because of some wild 
21 allegations of fraud which he's already brought up there. 
22 So anyway, so here we are today and — 
23 THE COURT: So your representation to me is that 
24 the arguments that Mr. Billings is making here today were 
25 presented to Judge Boulden. 
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MR. GUYON: Absolutely — 
MR. BILLINGS: I would appreciate it if you would 
take him under oath. 
MR. GUYON: — they were. 
MR. BILLINGS: Would the Court please swear -
THE COURT: 
is appearing here as 
that is not an approp 
a fact witness in the 
I'm not going to swear an attorney who 
an advocate. I'm sorry, Mr. Billings, 
riate position to put an attorney in as 
proceedings. 
MR. BILLINGS: He's offering evidence. That's all 
I'm saying — 
THE COURT: 
officer of the court 
He is making a representation as an 
and I am accepting a representation of 
an officer of the court. 
MR. GUYON: 
our purposes, Judge, 
Court that all these 
they disappeared. Th 
Well, the bottom line is I think for 
is that we've stated and showed the 
claims were agreed by Mr. Billings, that 
ere are no such claims and because there 
are no such claims, the claim that he's trying to bring in 
this Court has disapp 
regardless of whether 
judicata or collatera 
requires Mr. Billings 
question of material 
has to be a material 
eared also, as a matter of law. So 
the Court uses the issue of res 
1 estoppel, or summary judgment, Rule 56 
to, by sworn affidavit, create a 
fact, not just a question of fact but it 
fact and I'd simply point out to the 
21 
1 Court that all of the material facts are uncontroverted and 
2 that is that Mr. Billings was bound by the agreement and that 
3 it was - became part of the order in the Bankruptcy Court and 
4 the Bankruptcy Court confirmed that and it's binding against 
5 him as a matter of law. 
6 Does the Court have any other questions of me? 
7 THE COURT: No, I do not. 
8 MR. GUYON: Thank you. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. All right -
10 MR. BILLINGS: Your Honor, may I please respond to 
11 that? 
12 THE COURT: Ahhh -
13 MR. BILLINGS: He made some very serious claims 
14 there that are not true. 
15 THE COURT: Normally - I mean, this is their 
16 motion, so normally they get the reply but I will give you, 
17 given that you have come a long ways, I will give you the 
18 opportunity to make a final rebuttal but keep it brief. 
19 MR. BILLINGS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. It 
20 does seem to me that defendants don't understand the issue of 
21 res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
22 THE COURT: And you do? 
23 MR. BILLINGS: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Please inform me how you are so much 
25 more — 
22 
1 MR. BILLINGS: I'm just stating -
2 THE COURT: - better versed -
3 MR. BILLINGS: — well because I'm simply stating 
4 the correct rule. The rule speaks for itself. You can check 
5 it in the books. 
6 THE COURT: I am well aware of what the rules 
7 imply. 
8 MR. BILLINGS: It has to be an issue that was 
9 actually litigated in the Federal Bankruptcy Court. Now, 
10 counsel's representation that this issue was actually 
11 litigated in Federal Bankruptcy Court is absolutely false. 
12 THE COURT: That's not what I heard Mr. Guyon 
13 saying. 
14 MR. BILLINGS: He said all these arguments were 
15 brought before the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
16 THE COURT: Were presented to the court and 
17 considered by the court, whether they went through a whole 
18 adjudicative process or not is not I don't think what was 
19 represented by Mr. Guyon, but that it was presented to Judge 
20 Boulden and she had the opportunity to consider that. 
21 MR. BILLINGS: This is exactly why I preface my 
22 comments with it seems that counsel doesn't understand the 
23 requirements of res judicata, because it wouldn't matter that 
24 we just had a plethora of evidence, for example, it wouldn't 
25 matter for purpose of res judicata. What matters is whether 
23 
1 the court agreed to conduct a hearing on the issue and the 
2 court did not do that. We didn't have a discussion on 
3 whether or not this was a fraudulent document and so on. 
4 That wasn't even discussed. I asked the court if - I marked 
5 exhibits that demonstrated very clearly that - we premarked 
6 exhibits that demonstrated very clearly that this document is 
7 a fraud. I lodged those documents with the clerk. The judge 
8 says she's not going to allow me to introduce, to lay a 
9 foundation to introduce that evidence. So there was 
10 absolutely no hearing on that issue. And then the court 
11 said, move on to the other issues of jurisdiction and 
12 removal. In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the 
13 court would have had to have accepted those documents into 
14 evidence and to rule upon them. The court would have had to 
15 have made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to 
16 whether or not this document is a fraud or not. So the real 
17 issue here is that I've never had a day in court to 
18 demonstrate that this document is a fraud. 
19 I should also mention, of course, that I have filed 
20 a First Amended Complaint and even if the Court granted 
21 summary judgment on the first count which it absolutely 
22 should not, the rest of the complaint is still valid because 
23 it has absolutely nothing to do with that agreement. 
24 THE COURT: Well, no, because according to the 
25 Settlement Agreement that is before me that was again adopted 
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by Judge 
known or 
future c 
Boulden, the 
unknown, you 
MR. 
laims. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
BILLINGS 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
parties release all claims whether 
know, in any forum — 
: Not future claims, Your Honor, not 
Counsel, that's — 
No, it doesn't. 
That's what this language says. 
No, it doesn't. It doesn't say a 
word about future claims. (Inaudible) all future claims? 
document 
to 
is 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
• 
THE 
say unless 
MR. 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
COURT: 
there's 
BILLINGS 
I'll tell you, it happens all the time. 
: Well, I don't, and I didn't. 
Well -
: And it's not even in the fraudulent 
Well, I think I've heard what you need 
something new that you wanted to — 
: Just the final point is all of this 
obviously a controverted genuine issue as to material 
facts. 
on these 
clearly 
The Court is p >recluded from granting summary judgment 
issues, no res judicata, no collateral estoppel and 
these 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
facts have been controverted by my affidavit. 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
COURT: 
BILLINGS 
Where is your written affidavit? 
>: I filed it with the Court. 
I haven't seen it. 
>: Well, I filed it with the Court and 
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1 I also provided - I also provided — 
2 THE COURT: I received your memorandum, I have 
3 received something that you've labeled a Separate Statement 
4 of Disputed Facts, I'm not sure why I would consider a 
5 Separate Statement of Disputed Facts that is not part of your 
6 memorandum. This is not an authorized filing under Rule 7, 
7 but even there, there is no affidavit. 
8 MR. BILLINGS: Yes. On August 27th, if I could 
9 approach? I filed what's titled Opposition to Defendant's 
10 Motion for Summary Judgment. I did it very quickly because I 
11 was given nothing but email notices, but it is an affidavit 
12 signed by me — 
13 THE COURT: I do not - hold on a second. I need to 
14 check my docket because I do not see any such filing. 
15 MR. BILLINGS: I filed it with the court and I also 
16 left a courtesy copy in your chambers of each of these 
17 documents. The title of the document is Opposition to 
18 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and then it shows 
19 Declaration of Joseph Billings — 
20 THE COURT: I don't see an affidavit. I see -
21 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
22 MR. BILLINGS: It is an affidavit, the Opposition 
23 is an affidavit and it was filed August 27th and even the 
24 Separate Statement because of lack of time, is styled and 
25 presented as an affidavit under penalty of perjury and signed 
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1 under penalty of perjury. There's actually four documents 
2 that we should make sure the Court has. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. I do not know what you are 
4 referring to. 
5 MR. BILLINGS: May I approach? I can show you, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: The document entitled Memorandum of 
8 Points and Authority in Support of Opposition to Defendant's 
9 Motions for Summary judgment. Is that the document you're 
10 referring to? 
11 MR. BILLINGS: No, Your Honor, that's filed August 
12 31st. 
13 THE COURT: Yes. 
14 MR. BILLINGS: And a courtesy copy too. 
15 THE COURT: That's all I have seen. 
16 MR. BILLINGS: No, there's three other important 
17 documents. It sounds like you have one of them. 
18 THE COURT: I have a Separate Statement of Disputed 
19 Facts which as I say there's a procedural problem with how 
20 this has been filed — 
21 MR. BILLINGS: Well, (inaudible) to that, I was 
22 just putting these things together as quickly as possible in 
23 light of the fact that we were given basically ex parte 
24 notice of a summary judgment motion but I would also point 
25 out that the Separate Statement is presented also as a 
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declaration and as an affidavit under penalty of perjury and 
it's exhaustive in controverting the issues. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
to - that I'm 
COURT: Except that there is no recognized — 
BILLINGS: Affidavit. 
COURT: I don't see -
BILLINGS: Yes. 
COURT: Where? 
BILLINGS: You'll see in the first -
COURT: I see an -
BILLINGS: You'll see a footnote which refers 
also treating it as an declaration and then 
you'll also see at the back page — 
THE 
MR. 
last page — 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: I do not see a signature here. 
BILLINGS: Sure, there's a signature on the 
COURT: There is no signature. There is an yS'. 
BILLINGS: That's the courtesy copy. 
COURT: It's not marked courtesy copy. 
COURT CLERK: Judge, we're talking about six 
different things, (inaudible) because they don't want 
courtesy copies (inaudible) so in case somebody ends up - I 
docketed some r she's docketed some. They're not marked 
courtesy copies so we're marking them all as originals and 
it's getting < 
MR. 
confusing. 
BILLINGS: The originals are all filed with the 
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1 clerk's office and signed. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I don't have those in front of 
3 me. 
4 MR. BILLINGS: All of the originals have been 
5 signed and apparently you don't even have any sort of copy of 
6 the document that I first filed immediately, my affidavit 
7 opposing this motion which is itself sufficient to preclude 
8 summary judgment which was filed on August 27, 2009. Can I 
9 approach to show you that? 
10 THE COURT: Do you have that and does that show on 
11 the docket? 
12 CLERK: (Inaudible). We got a bunch of stuff 
13 yesterday afternoon — 
14 MR. BILLINGS: This was August 27th -
15 CLERK: — (inaudible). And I do have a bunch of 
16 stuff that we got yesterday and it looks like we docketed 
17 this morning. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah. The only thing I'm seeing is -
19 MR. BILLINGS: I'll be happy to sign this one. 
20 THE COURT: What? 
21 COURT CLERK: What is that titled? 
22 THE COURT: This is titled Opposition to 
23 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
24 COURT CLERK: We have two copies of that. 
25 THE COURT: We do? Okay. You may take that back. 
29 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. BILLINGS: Thank you. Did you get a copy of 
the First Amended Complaint? 
COURT CLERK: We have two copies of that as well. 
THE 
anything. I ; 
COURT: Okay. I don't need duplicate copies of 
just need one copy unless it's specifically 
marked courtesy copy, I do not want to see it. 
MR. 
her, should I 
THE 
MR. 
it's stamped. 
THE 
accept - cour-
they come in 
because they' 
morning of th 
MR. 
THE 
review them. 
MR. 
setting this 
THE 
submitted. I 
the documenta 
BILLINGS: I gave it to the clerk and I asked 
mark it courtesy copy and — 
COURT: Okay -
BILLINGS: — and she said it doesn't matter, 
COURT: No, it matters. I don't - I don't 
tesy copies, I will accept only in advance if 
substantially in advance of oral argument 
re worthless to me when they're filed on the 
a argument. 
BILLINGS: I understand, but -
COURT: There's just no opportunity for me to 
BILLINGS: This is one of the strategies in 
thing with less than five days notice. 
COURT: But, all right. Well, the matter is 
will, because it's clear that I don't have all 
tion in front of me, I will take it under 
advisement, review the paperwork and I will inform the 
30 
1 parties of my decision. 
2 MR. BILLINGS: I have one question, would you 
3 entertain - the memorandum of points of authority I had to do 
4 very quickly and there seems to be some question here of 
5 exactly how does res judicata and collateral estoppel come 
6 down, would the Court permit some additional 
7 I THE COURT: No. The motion has been - I don't want 
to create further supplementation because if I let you 
9 I supplement then I need to give Mr. Guyon the opportunity to 
10 supplement. I am perfectly capable of distinguishing res 
11 adjudicata and collateral estoppel and applying it to the 
12 facts. I understand your argument, I will consider it. 
13 MR. BILLINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 MR. GUYON: Thank you, Judge. 
15 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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APPLICALBE RULES OF COVK ( ON APPEAL 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (c)(3)(A): 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of 
material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Section 7 (c)(3)(A). 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 s 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim 
or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from 
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue 
as to the amount of damages. 
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(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by 
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. 
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial 
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the partyfs opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment 
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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APPLICALBE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
1. U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment 
Fourteenth Amendment - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2. Utah State Constitution Article I, Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
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